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Abstract—This paper proposes an extended Selective Encryp-
tion (SE) method for both H.264/AVC (CABAC) and HEVC
streams. Namely, this work addresses the main security issue that
SE is facing : the content protection, related to the amount of
information leakage through a protected video. Our contribution
is the improvement of the visual distortion induced by SE
approaches. If previous works on both H.264/AVC (CABAC) and
HEVC limit encryption to bins treated by one specific mode
of CABAC: its by-pass mode - which has the advantage of
preserving the overall bitrate -, we propose here to also rely
on the encryption of the more widely used mode of CABAC:
its regular mode. This allows to encrypt a major codeword for
video reconstruction : the prediction modes for Intra blocks/units.
Disturbing their statistics may cause bitrate overhead, which is
the trade-off for improving the content security level of the SE
approach. A comprehensive study of this compromise between
the improvement of the scrambling efficiency and the undesirable
aftereffects is proposed in this paper, and a specific security
analysis of the proposed CABAC regular mode encryption is
conducted.
Index Terms—HEVC, H.264/AVC, Selective Encryption,
CABAC
I. INTRODUCTION
H .264/AVC (Advanced Video Coding) [1] and its suc-cessor HEVC (High Efficiency Video Coding) [2] are
two of the main video coding standards nowadays used for
compressing video data, providing efficient tools adapted to
multiple uses such as broadcasting, storage, video on de-
mand, etc. Their high compression ratios are partly achieved
thanks to the arithmetic coder CABAC (Context Adaptive
Binary Arithmetic Coder) used by both standards (alongside
with the Context Adaptive Variable Length Coder CAVLC in
H.264/AVC). Equipped with a context modeler and a built-in
table of probability models, it tries to exploit at best the syntax
element statistics to improve the compression efficiency.
Video encryption techniques enable applications like Digital
Rights Management (DRM) and video scrambling. When con-
fidentiality is a major priority, encryption of the entire video
stream is advised. However, in some application scenarios,
Partial Encryption (PE) methods - which aim at scrambling a
selected subset of the data to protect - have been proposed
as a flexible alternative to standard encryption algorithms.
Such approaches can save computational complexity or enable
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Fig. 1: Selectively Encrypted video streams can be decoded
but are visually ciphered for unauthorized users.
new system functionalities based on priors concerning the
message to protect. In this work, we focus on PE methods
that preserve the stream format, which we will refer to as
Selective Encryption (SE) (Figure 1). Streams protected by
SE are decodable, which ensures their correct processing
by untrusted middlebox in the network (for watermarking,
transcoding, etc.), but their intelligibility is restrained.
SE approaches face two main challenges : first, the dis-
tortion induced on the video content heavily depends on the
cipherable elements in the stream - constituting the Encryption
Space (ES) -, so it is not possible to guarantee that all of the
source information is concealed during encryption [3]. Second,
the encryption security has to be validated and, in a broader
perspective, has to be robust in all types of network / real-time
/ lossy communications [4].
In this paper, we address the specific issue of the content
security and improve the scrambling effect of traditional
SE approaches. Based on our previous work on a cipher-
ing transcoder for H.264/AVC and HEVC streams [5], our
main contribution implies an extension of the ES available
with CABAC encoded streams. In practice, one novel syntax
element, selected for its major importance in video recon-
struction, is included into the ES : the prediction modes for
Intra blocks (H.264/AVC) and Intra units (HEVC). Since their
encoding relies on probability models, their encryption may
disturb the symbol statistics and cause a bitrate overhead.
However, we show that the approach significantly diminishes
the information leakage through a protected frame. The present
paper gathers a detailed description of the proposed Intra
prediction mode encryption, and extensively discusses the
miscellaneous consequences of the approach.
The rest of the document is organized as follows: Section 2
briefly presents H.264/AVC and HEVC video coding standards
and discusses the use of SE on compressed video streams.
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Section 3 details the proposed encryption of Luma prediction
modes for Intra blocks/units. In section 4, we propose an
evaluation of the proposed scheme with regard to the state
of the art approaches, and conduct a specific security analysis
of the proposed encryption. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
section 5.
II. SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION IN VIDEO COMPRESSION
A. Brief presentation of H.264/AVC and HEVC video coding
standards
Compression standards H.264/AVC and HEVC implement
an hybrid approach exploiting spatial and temporal redundancy
contained in a video sequence.
The main characteristics of H.264/AVC standard [1] are
the following: each frame is divided in 16x16 MacroBlocks
(MB) encoded independently. The encoding protocol of each
MB consists in successive steps: MB are first split in 4x4
and 8x8 blocks, then an Integer Transform (IT) followed
by a quantization is applied on every block. Predictions
between blocks for both Intra and inter frames are then
computed, alongside with a motion estimation module, in
order to exploit the spatial and temporal redundancy of the
source video. Finally, two entropy coders are available for
optimizing compression efficiency. H.264/AVC can either use
a run length coder CAVLC (Context Adaptive Variable Length
Coding) or an arithmetic coder CABAC (Context Adaptive
Binary Arithmetic Coding). CAVLC, specified for all profiles
in H.264/AVC, is a lower complexity but less efficient entropy
coder than CABAC, which is only available in main and
high profiles. This paper will not address the problem of SE
of H.264/AVC/CAVLC streams [6][7][8], but will only focus
on applying SE on streams encoded with CABAC. Figure 2
presents the overall architecture for encoding video frames
with H.264/AVC.
HEVC standard [2] greatly improved the compression effi-
ciency of its predecessor without modifying the whole en-
coding structure [9]. Nevertheless, several modifications in
all the crucial stages were implemented: MBs are replaced
with Coding Tree Units (containing Coding Units from 64x64
to 16x16) allowing flexible sub-partitioning using a quadtree
structure. In addition, several improvements were made on
the other steps of the encoding architecture; increase of the
number of prediction modes, new transform sizes from 4x4 to
32x32, new modes available for parallel encoding (Tiles and
Wavefront Processing), etc. The numerous features introduced
by HEVC standard are explicitly highlighted in [10]. Despite
a slightly higher computational cost, CABAC is the only pro-
posed entropy coder. Although it has seen some modifications
(essentially simplifications, as described in [11]), this final step
of both standards is thus quite equivalent.
B. Main properties of SE
The strong relationship between data compression and en-
cryption was pointed out by C. Shannon in [12] by demon-
strating that removing source redundancies could strengthen
encryption. Traditional approach for content access control
consists of compressing data with a standard coder that
Fig. 2: H.264/AVC-CABAC encoding architecture.
removes (or tries to remove) all redundancies, and then
encrypting the whole bitstream: all bits are assumed to be
of equal importance or statistics. However, this assumption
is hardly valid for H.264/AVC and HEVC video streams
since both standards produce streams with a very specific
syntax (start codes, headers, etc.). Moreover, in the traditional
approach, standard cipher algorithms (e.g. the Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) [13]) bring an additional complexity
requirement. If recent software and hardware optimizations of
these methods allow the process of up to 150 MB/s [14], the
encryption/decryption processes may become time and energy
consuming for large-scale data: streams at high resolutions
(4K, 8K) and high bitrates.
The most straightforward method to secure video content is
thus to encrypt the whole bitstream using standard encryption
algorithms. This method called Naive Encryption Algorithm
(NEA), which treats the video bitstream as some random
binary data, suffers from several drawbacks. First, the en-
cryption/decryption processes are time and energy consuming
for large scale data, limiting the suitability for real-time or
mobile device supported transmissions. Second, NEA prevents
untrusted middlebox in the network to perform post-processing
operations on the bitsream such as transcoding or watermark-
ing. Third, the NEA solution does not apply well to scalable
video contents, preventing sub-stream extraction for network
adaption and error resilience.
In contrast, SE considers the coding structure of the video
bitstream and encrypts only a selected subset of the com-
pressed stream. More flexible, SE solutions can provide a
different range of functionalities. First, the encrypted stream
remains compliant with the standard, and the compression ratio
is not (or very little) affected. This ensures correct processing
of the protected file by middlebox processes (transcoding,
scalable sub-stream extraction, etc.) and makes the protection
hardly detectable. Second, since the number of bits to encrypt
is drastically reduced compared to NEA, SE introduces only
minimum additional delay and complexity. Third, SE can
benefit from the stream coding structure to propose specific
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encryption architectures. For example, the scrambling effect
induced by SE can be weighted as proposed in [15]. It allows
video broadcasters to offer a low quality preview functionality
that can be used to convince viewers to buy the full content.
Another example is the adaption of SE to the protection of
Regions of Interest (ROI). Namely, the work of M. Farajallah
et al. [16] makes use of HEVC slicing of images in tiles to
propose a robust ROI based encryption scheme.
Since SE cannot guarantee that all of the source infor-
mation is hidden during encryption, it is not suitable for
applications with strict security requirements. In such cases,
SE and standard encryption may be coupled to cumulate the
protection strengths. In contrast, when only full quality access
is forbidden, SE can successfully be applied as a flexible and
cost-effective content access control solution.
C. Overview of recent works on partial and selective of
compressed video streams
In the literature, different domains have been considered
as valid candidates for PE: pixels (where PE happens before
compression), entropy coders or quantized transforms (where
alternate compression schemes are exploited), and bitstreams
(where PE is performed after - or during - compression).
Characteristics of the PE methods directly depend on the
domain where they are inserted.
In [17], Yeung et al. suggested a transform-based PE
method, with the use of different unitary transforms than
Discrete Cosine and Sine Transform (DCT/DST) specified in
H.264/AVC standard, resulting in a lower coding efficiency.
Their work was extended to 8x8 transform size for H.264/AVC
high profile in [18]. In [19], Wu et al. propose an entropy
coding-based PE scheme, with the use of Huffman tables as an
alternative entropy coder. However, this technique also causes
a bit-rate increase and is vulnerable to plain-text attacks [20].
Other techniques, like key-based interval splitting in [21] or
randomized arithmetic coding [22], try to perform encryption
during entropy coding. However, this first group of techniques
has one main drawback: the resulting streams are not fully
format-compliant, which drastically limits its interoperability.
The rest of this study will focus on bitstream-compliant
applications of PE, referred to as SE in this paper.
A pixel-based SE scheme is proposed by Carillo et al. in
[23]. A permutation of pixels that are in the Regions of Interest
(ROI) is performed before compression (and conversely after
decompression). Although the method ensures the format com-
pliancy of the encrypted stream, some severe drawbacks can
be exhibited: the compression efficiency drastically decreases
as the ROI statistics are disrupted and it cannot ensure that
compression artifacts do not affect the ROI.
Bitstream-based SE schemes may appear as the most ef-
ficient solution, as the one developed by Bergeron et al.
in [6] for H.264/AVC CAVLC. This approach exploits an
explicit parsing of the stream to identify and encrypt a set
of cipherable syntax elements. The establishment of the ES
and the monitoring of the modifications are the main issues
of such methods [8][24].
Shahid et al. proposed to perform SE on CABAC encoded
streams in [25]. The extended application of SE to CABAC
encoded streams is a challenging work since inter-dependency
between bits of the compressed streams is maximum. They
proposed to encrypt bin strings instead of the bit-stream, and
to select only model-free bins in order to preserve context
models management. Their works led to a few others, like
the proposal of Asghar et al. for the SE of scalable mode of
H.264/SVC [26]. Some other extensions of the process rely on
tunable SE schemes, which are either perceptual-based ([24],
[27]) or region-based ([28], [29]).
This basis was exploited to perform bitstream-based SE on
HEVC streams. Nevertheless, being a rather recent standard,
few works can be referenced in this domain. Shahid et al.
presented in [30] one of the first methods for SE of HEVC,
inspired by their previous work on H.264/AVC CABAC en-
cryption. Another method proposed in [31] suggests to pseudo-
randomly flip a fixed percentage of bins - namely, coefficient
signs - to provide a sufficient but minimal encryption. All of
these methods rely on model-free encryption, which has the
great advantage to preserve the overall stream bitrate.
In [15], Van Wallendael et al. details an adaptive SE
approach and try to gather all the different cipherable syntax
elements in HEVC streams. Their work distinguishes from
previous methods as it also implies the explicit management of
CABAC context modeler. Their encryption scheme authorizes
bigger variations of cipherable codewords than the traditional
bitwise modifications, which improves the induced distortion
at the cost of a decreased compression efficiency. Their paper
proposes one of the first analysis of this specific compro-
mise between the scrambling performance and the bitrate
increase. In the present paper, another approach based on an
explicit monitoring of CABAC is proposed, which specifically
focuses on Luma prediction modes for Intra blocks/units.
Since they have a major role in the video reconstruction,
encryption of this specific syntax element has been proposed
for H.264/AVC-CAVLC in some papers [24][28][32]. In the
case of CABAC encoded video streams, and more particularly
within the recent HEVC standard, their encryption is not
straightforward, and, to the best of our knowledge, has not
been proposed yet.
III. CONTENT SECURITY: CABAC REGULAR MODE
SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION
A. Understanding the CABAC entropy coder
The generic design of CABAC is a combination of an
adaptive binary arithmetic coding technique with a well-
designed set of context models. Figure 3 shows the standard
encoding process for a single syntax element with CABAC
for both H.264/AVC and HEVC. We remind here that the
major difference between the CABAC of both standards is
the simplification of the context modeling stage: decrease of
the number of probability models, increase of the number of
by-pass treated bins [11]. The remainder of this section details
the step-by-step encoding protocol.
- Binarization: First, a given non-binary valued symbol is
mapped to a binary codeword called bin string. This unique
representation obtained during the binarization process should
be close to a minimum-redundancy code. In practice, several
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Fig. 3: The different steps of Context Adaptive Binary Arith-
metic Coding (CABAC)
H.264/AVC HEVC Has impact on :
MVD sign Yes Yes P frames
MVD value Yes* Yes P frames
MV ref idx No Yes P frames
MV merge idx - Yes P frames
MVP idx No Yes P frames
CU/MB delta QP Yes Yes I and P frames
Residual signs Yes Yes I and P frames
Residual values Yes Yes I and P frames
SAO filter related codewords - Yes I and P frames
TABLE I: Cipherable by-passed syntax elements in both standards
(*: under constraints)
basic code trees are used for a simple on-line computation
[33]. If the input symbol is already in binary form, this first
binarization module is by-passed.
Depending on the a priori estimations on the probability
distribution of the symbol that is being encoded, two different
modules can perform the arithmetic coding.
- By-pass coding engine: The by-pass mode is chosen for
symbols whose distribution is assumed to be equiprobable. In
this case, an adequate probability model does not exist, so bin
strings are coded without any contextual information.
- Regular coding engine: The most interesting aspect of
arithmetic coding is the possibility to interface efficiently a
model representation and the subsequent arithmetic coding,
which is the core of CABAC regular mode. The design of
adequate statistical models that are to be kept up-to-date is thus
of prime importance. In order to minimize the computational
costs, CABAC protocol only exploits a limited number of
context templates and limits its use to bin strings obtained after
binarization. The probability model of each bin is determined
by the type of syntax element, the bin position and from the
context (e.g., spatial neighbors, position in CTU, ...). Once
the probability model is selected, the arithmetic coding engine
manages the bin encoding, then updates the model according
to the encoded bin value.
B. CABAC selective encryption
The aim of SE techniques is to identify all (or a selected
part) of the stream syntax elements that can be scrambled
without disrupting a standard decoding process. However, due
to the arithmetic encoding step, bits in CABAC compressed
streams are very interdependent. The adequate spot for per-
forming SE is thus after the binarization step [30], which
allows to work on bin strings that have a meaning from a
decoder point of view. This is the main difference between
SE of CAVLC encoded streams, which can be performed on
the fly, and SE of CABAC encoded streams, which requires a
prior arithmetic decoding stage.
In the SE approach, a bin string is considered as cipherable
if it satisfies the following constraints. First, the bin modifica-
tion must not modify the overall decoding process. Namely,
the interpretation of changes must not lead to any mismatch
between encoding and decoding processes (initialization and
termination protocols, number/order of calls for data, selection
of the related probability models, etc.). Plus, encryption must
preserve the symbol validity, which restricts modifications to a
domain in which we ensure that a standard decoder will accept
the modified symbol. Checking both constraints ensures the
compatibility of the modified stream with the video standard.
Since by-passed bins do not exploit and update probability
models during the arithmetic coding, their encryption is possi-
ble as long as the induced modifications do not disrupt a stan-
dard decoding process [30]. Some cipherable syntax elements
are into this first category of by-pass encoded codewords: sign
of Motion Vector Difference (MVD), Sample Adaptive Offset
(SAO) related information in HEVC, etc. Table I summarizes
all the identified cipherable codewords treated by the by-pass
mode of CABAC, which will be considered in the rest of this
paper as the state-of-the-art ES [15]. Note that a few more
codewords - motion vector reference indexes (MV ref idx) and
predictor indexes (MVP idx) - are available for encryption in
HEVC standard, thanks to the simplification of the CABAC
module. Two main categories can be distinguished: motion
encryption (sign/value of MVD, MV ref idx, MVP idx) and
texture encryption (sign/value of residual data, delta QP, SAO
related codewords).
The limited number of by-passed syntax elements raises the
question of sufficient deterioration of the encrypted stream,
particularly on I frames. Indeed, motion encryption has no
impact on these key frames, limiting the visual deterioration
to the scrambling of residual data (as SAO filter encryption has
a very limited impact on the video reconstruction). To achieve
superior levels of protection, authors of [15] performed non-
bitwise encryption and introduced the concept of encryption
strength. In the present paper, a complementary way of im-
proving the encryption strength is proposed, which rely on
the inclusion into the ES of a novel codeword encoded with
CABAC regular mode.
From the arithmetic coding engine perspective, encryption
of CABAC regular mode is similar to bypass mode encryption.
However, particular attention has to be given to the context
modeler: indeed, changing the value of a coded bin must be
reflected in the subsequent probability model update. The main
aftereffect of regular mode encryption is the perturbation of
the syntax elements statistics, which decreases the CABAC
compression efficiency. This is the main drawback of the
proposed method, as by-pass encoded bins can be encrypted
without modifying the source bitrate [25]. However, exper-
imental results detailed in this paper show that the bitrate
increase remains acceptable (empirically up to 0.5%). Some
cipherable codewords may be identified within this available
set of regular mode treated syntax elements. In order to
significantly improve the impact of the ES on I frames, we
chose to focus our study on the encryption of the Luma
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Fig. 4: The nine different prediction modes in H.264/AVC.
prediction modes for Intra blocks/units, because of their major
role in the video reconstruction.
C. Encryption of Luma Prediction modes for Intra blocks in
H.264/AVC-CABAC
H.264/AVC and HEVC both rely on Intra prediction for
efficiently exploiting the spatial redundancy between neigh-
boring blocks. Since both standard process images in raster
scan order, previously decoded data is often available during
the decoding of a block/unit. The Intra prediction is used to
exploit this information, by interpolating top and left data
alongside a given direction. In H.264/AVC nine modes are thus
implemented (Figure 4) to efficiently propagate basic structural
information between neighboring blocks.
In practice, for each current block during the decoding
process, a most probable mode is derived from adjacent blocks
as the minimum of their respective Intra prediction modes.
The current block is either encoded with this mode, which
is specified with a flag (prev Intra4x4 pred mode flag), or
encoded with one of the eight remaining modes. In this
case, the mode is coded with a fixed length three bits
rem Intra4x4 pred mode codeword. Both of these syntax
elements use CABAC regular mode and probability models
in order to improve the compression capabilities.
To modify the prediction modes is an efficient way to induce
a strong visual scramble in protected streams. Thus, it has
already been proposed for H.264/AVC-CAVLC in [32]. To
ensure the validity of the protected stream, attention has to
be paid to blocks laying on edges of image slices. Indeed, all
modes are not permitted for these blocks, which prevents their
encryption. In [32], prediction modes are thus modified for all
other blocks with a combination of permutations and bitwise
modifications of the original prediction modes.
In this paper, we propose to reuse this method to encrypt
luma prediction modes for H.264/AVC-CABAC encoded video
streams. Since their encoding rely on probability models, the
relative codewords can be modified as long as model are
updated accordingly. Doing so, we ensure that the resulting
(a) SCAN VERT
5<pred mode<16
(b) SCAN HORIZ
21<pred mode<31
(c) SCAN DIAG
otherwise
Fig. 5: The three different scanning modes in HEVC, depending on
the prediction mode used by the current unit.
stream is format compliant and can be decoded by stan-
dard H.264/AVC-CABAC decoders. However, disturbing the
symbol statistics may diminish the compression efficiency,
which is the evident counterpart to the improvement of the
scrambling performance of by-pass only scrambling schemes.
D. Encryption of Luma Prediction modes for Intra units in
HEVC
Some modifications of the Intra prediction process have
to be mentioned between H.264/AVC and HEVC. First, the
number of prediction modes has increased (from 9 to 34). It
ensures an increased precision in the direction interpolation
and largely improves the predictive performance for big size
units. Another important modification is the new dependency
between a unit prediction mode and the scanning mode used
for residual coding (Figure 5). This latter point imposes a
very specific monitoring of the encryption with HEVC, which
will be detailed in the next subsection. Finally, the encoding
process has been improved compared to H.264/AVC.
Indeed, the use of a most probable mode has been ex-
tended to three default modes to improve the compression
capabilities. In practice, their encoding still depends on a flag
called prev Intra Luma pred flag (the syntax of this section
is directly extracted from [10]).
Flag set to ’1’: encoding by MPM (Most Probable Mode).
A mpm idx is coded with two (or one) by-passed bin(s)
(truncated unary code of length 2) specifying which of three
pre-selected modes is chosen. Pre-selected modes are derived
from the neighborhood (namely, from top and left unit modes)
and stored in a table called CandModList[].
Flag set to ’0’: the prediction mode is encoded separately.
A rem Intra Luma pred mode codeword - fixed length 5 by-
passed bins - is used to infer the prediction mode as follows
(where CandModList[] is the same table as above, simply
reordered in ascending order):
for (i = 0; i < 3; i ++)
if (rem Intra Luma pred mode > CandModList [i])
rem Intra Luma pred mode ++;
IntraPredMode = rem Intra Luma pred mode;
Consequently, one can note that in HEVC standard,
there is a strong dependency between the current unit
mode and its neighborhood, even in the case of a
prev Intra Luma pred flag set to ’0’.
We propose in this paper to encrypt all the pre-
diction modes for Intra units, i.e. all mpm idx and
rem intra Luma pred mode present in the original stream.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECHNOLOGY 6
Nb. coded Coeff. SCAN VERT SCAN HORIZ SCAN DIAG
1 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
2 (0,1) (1,0) (0,1)
3 (0,2) (2,0) (1,0)
4 (0,3) (3,0) (0,2)
5 (1,0) (0,1) (1,1)
.. .. .. ..
16 (3,3) (3,3) (3,3)
TABLE II: Coordinates of the last coded coefficient in a 4x4 unit,
depending on the number of coded coefficients and the scanning mode
used. A similar look-up table is built for 8x8 units.
However, some precautions must be taken in order to ensure
the format compliancy of the encrypted stream. The first
constraint to be highlighted is the availability of the current
unit to be encrypted. As for H.264/AVC, all prediction modes
may not be allowed for units lying on the edges of the image
slices. Therefore, these units are not encrypted for security.
This condition alone does not suffice to produce format
compliant streams. Indeed, one novelty of HEVC standard
is the use of three different scanning modes described in
Figure 5 (SCAN VERT, SCAN HORIZ and SCAN DIAG)
for 4x4 and 8x8 units, particularly significant in our context.
Indeed, the choice of a scanning mode modifies the way
residual data is encoded. Therefore, if SE is applied to Intra
prediction modes, a standard decoder will use potentially
modified scanning modes to decode the residual data. Due
to the very strict formatting of the encoded residual, such a
modification disturbs the decoding process and prevents the
normal stream decoding.
Consequently, we propose in the next subsection a low-
cost method to re-encode the residual data according to the
modified prediction mode obtained after encryption. One can
note that the knowledge of the prediction mode obtained after
encryption is not straightforward, due to the strict dependency
between a unit mode and its neighborhood. In practice, our
approach thus requires to keep track of the successive modi-
fications in order to correctly anticipate the prediction modes
which will be inferred by a standard decoder processing the
protected stream.
E. HEVC: suitable encoding of Residual Data
Figure 5 details the different scanning modes used depend-
ing on the unit prediction mode (note that coding units strictly
bigger than 8x8 always exploit the diagonal scan). In HEVC
standard, the first operation made to decode the residual data
is to recover the number of coded coefficients in the unit.
This information is derived from the position of the last coded
coefficient - namely, its coordinates inside the unit -, and from
the scanning mode used. For example, if the coordinates of the
last coded coefficient are (1,1), there are 5 remaining coded
coefficients with both horizontal and vertical scans, whereas
only 4 with the diagonal scan (Figure 5).
We now consider the specific case of an Intra unit whose
scanning mode has been modified by SE of its prediction
mode. One can note that its size is either 4x4 or 8x8, since
all other unit sizes use the diagonal scan. If the residual
data buffer has been rewritten without any precaution, there
is a high risk of a modification of the number of encoded
coefficients inside the unit, which prevents the stream normal
decoding. To correctly encode the residual data according to
the modified scanning mode, one solution would be to simply
re-encode the whole unit. However, we propose an efficient
and inexpensive alternative: to modify only the position of the
last significant coefficient, ensuring that the same number of
coefficients is processed in the original and the encrypted unit.
This cost-effective solution allows to preserve the size (in bins)
of the encoded buffer and induces an additional scramble in
the unit due to the shift of the residual coefficients.
Thus, we use two look-up tables (see Table II for the 4x4
look-up table) that summarize, depending on the scanning
mode and the total number of encoded coefficients, the po-
sition of the unit last encoded coefficient. Then, for each unit
whose scanning mode has been modified by SE, we use them
to infer the equivalent coordinates (in terms of total number
of coded coefficients) of the last coefficient in the encrypted
unit.
Note that these targeted coordinates exist and are unique: it
is a bijective operation, which enables us to ensure the sym-
metry of the protocol. It only remains to binarize according
to HEVC standard the values obtained [9]. These values then
replace the original ones in the residual data buffer, while
the remaining data is not modified. Doing so, we ensure
that residuals fit with encrypted prediction modes, which
guarantees the correct decoding of the stream by standard
decoders.
Our approach can be summarized as follows. For each
cipherable unit (not lying on an edge of a slice or a tile), the
prediction mode is encrypted by bitwise modifications on the
relative codewords. All changes are interpreted in order to infer
the modified prediction modes, i.e. the ones that will be read
by a standard decoder. Residual buffers are then considered
only if their relative scanning mode has been changed during
the encryption process. In this case, the position of the last
coded coefficient is interpreted from the original stream. Two
look-up tables (for 4x4 and 8x8 units) are used to derive
the corresponding coefficient position according to the new
scanning mode. These coordinates replace the original ones in
the residual buffer, while the remaining data is not modified.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Methodology
In a standard approach, SE is embedded inside the arith-
metic coder of the video encoder/decoder. Such a deployment
ensures that the complexity induced by SE is minimal. How-
ever, considering the use of off-the-shelf optimized encoders
and decoders, the embedding of the specific SE module is
not straightforward, which may limit the applicability of the
method. To circumvent this difficulty, we choose to implement
the SE framework inside a ciphering transcoder, as we already
proposed in our previous work [5]. Although this choice is
not optimal in terms of complexity, it is an autonomous tool
that does not require changes of the pre-existing encoders /
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(a) Original frame (I) (b) Motion encryption (c) Texture encryption (d) Structure encryption
(e) Original frame (P : I+5) (f) Motion encryption (g) Texture encryption (h) Structure encryption
Fig. 6: Visual impact of motion, texture and the proposed structure encryption on a zoomed part of H.264/AVC encoded
BasketballDrive sequence
decoders and therefore retains the advantages of graphic accel-
erators or other hardware optimizations. Plus, it is developed
as a symmetrical operation on the stream, which again limits
the equipments needed to set up the device.
To perform the bitwise modifications on the cipherable bins,
we use a standard encryption algorithm: the Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) [13]. More precisely, we implemented
the CTR mode which uses a 128-bit Initialization Vector (IV)
- often built from the concatenation of a fixed seed and a
counter - to generate a pseudo-random sequence. When a bin
is to be ciphered, the last bit of the sequence is extracted
and XORed with the original bin to produce the protected
bin. If the sequence is emptied, the counter part of the IV is
incremented and a new pseudo-random sequence is generated.
AES-CTR mode combines many advantages: its robustness
is widely validated [34], it is a pre-calculable algorithm that
allows to start decryption from any point in the stream, and
its properties of symmetry and parallelism are particularly
convenient for software/hardware optimizations [35].
The effect of transmission errors will not be extensively
discussed in this paper. Yet, some solutions exist in the
literature as the one we proposed in our recent work [4]. It
implements a modified AES-CTR mode in order to allow a
per-slice synchronization of the decryption, based on the use of
identified uncipherable elements of the communication. This
procedure prevents potential transmission errors from causing
a decryption drift that propagates to the next slices. Thus, it
provides robustness to SE communications over error-probe
transmission channels. We invite the reader to refer to [4] for
further details on the proposed AES-CTR specific set-up and
an analysis of its robustness against transmission errors.
In this paper, security is measured as the amount of in-
formation leakage through a protected frame. The evaluation
of the scrambling performance of the proposed encryption
scheme will be based on a set of sequences, encoded with
H.264/AVC and HEVC reference softwares (JM v18.4 and HM
v16.3). In order to exhibit significant results, our set of test
videos, extracted from HEVC standardization process [36],
gathers resolutions ranging from 416x240 (BasketballPass) to
1080p (BasketballDrive). The encoding use a 16 frames Group
Of Picture (GOP) with a hierarchical B structure for good
compression performance, and a Quantization Parameter (QP)
of 32. The set of clear sequences is transcoded and encrypted
with the proposed extended ES to produce a set of protected
sequences. A comparative evaluation is proposed with the
method that produces the best scrambling performance in
the literature [15]. Our implementation of the state of the
art approach performs bitwise modifications only on each
cipherable codeword, which allows to preserve the overall
bitrate of the protected streams. Please note that the delta QP
codeword is not available for encryption in our study since we
do not perform bitrate constrained encodings. A second set of
protected videos is thus generated with the aforementioned
method.
Both of the protected sets are then decoded by an untrusted
device (which does not have the encryption key), and the
results are compared to the original streams.
B. Visual analysis
Since SE methods aim at protecting a video stream by
deteriorating its comprehensibility, the available content se-
curity level is directly related to the amount of information
leakage in the protected frames. Note that the visual analysis
performed in this section is complemented with additional
examples (images and videos) on our academic website [37].
As we already pointed out in Table I, the different cipherable
syntax elements have different impacts on the video rendering.
To correctly describe this property, we propose a semantical
decomposition of the ES as follows:
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(a) Original frame (I) (b) Motion + Texture encryption ([15]) (c) Proposed Motion+texture+structure encryption
(d) Original frame (P : I+10) (e) Motion + Texture encryption ([15]) (f) Proposed Motion+texture+structure encryption
Fig. 7: Overall visual results of the SE approaches on HEVC encoded Stefan sequence (CIF, QP32).
Type of encryption Related cipherable elements
Motion encryption MVD sign/value, MV ref idx*,
MV merge idx*, MVP idx*
Texture encryption Residual sign/value, delta QP,
SAO filter related codewords*
Structure encryption Luma prediction modes (Intra)
*: HEVC only
Two quick remarks can be made on this proposed decom-
position. First, the first two categories form the state-of-the-
art ES as defined in [15] whereas the latter corresponds to
our present contribution. Second, as illustrated in Table I, one
can note that motion encryption has no impact on Intra-coded
frames.
In Figure 6, we gathered the visual results of performing
SE with each separate encryption domain. It confirms the idea
that each encryption domain has a specific effect. Particularly,
Figures 6c and 6g justify the choice of denoting as texture
encryption the modification of the residual data. Indeed, the
induced scrambling impacts colors and flat regions whereas
it hardly dissimulate the structural information (background,
white lines on the floor). In contrast, strong structural dete-
rioration is observed with motion encryption, but on moving
areas of P/B frames only.
In Figure 7, a comparative evaluation of the proposed SE
scheme is performed with regard to the standard approach
[15]. In Figure 7e, it is noticeable that motion encryption
has contributed to the degradation of some structural contents
(body of the player, background advertisements) compared to
the Intra frame (fig. 7b). The main drawback of the standard
ES is highlighted here: the protection of Intra frames, relying
on texture encryption only, cannot efficiently conceal structural
information. In comparison, our approach (figs. 7c and 7f)
offers a far more robust dissimulation of the content, thanks
to the efficient structural scrambling, even on the Intra coded
frame. This improvement is obtained thanks to the proposed
structure encryption isolated in Figures 6d and 6h, which
efficiently diminishes the structural coherence of protected
frames. In order to emphasize this observation, the application
of a Sobel filter [38] on both protected streams is performed
in Figure 8. The Sobel filter is based on an isotropic 3x3
gradient which emphasizes edges and transitions. Each pixel
in the filtered frames in Figures 8d, 8e and 8f thus corresponds
to the magnitude of the local gradient on that pixel. Even if it
produces relatively crude results - particularly for regions with
high frequency variations -, the Sobel filter allows an inexpen-
sive and rather efficient analysis of the structural information
within an image. It is clearly noticeable that our method
conceals more efficiently edges and shapes (figs. 8e and 8f),
which confirms that the proposed ES extension diminishes the
information leakage through the protected frames.
C. Numerical analysis
1) Quantifying the increased visual distortion: To support
the visual results illustrated previously, we provide in this
section a numerical analysis of the SE efficiency. The metrics
used in the literature to describe the scrambling effect on video
contents are usually the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR),
the Structural SIMilarity (SSIM) and their Bjontegaard formu-
lation [39]. Their computation allows to efficiently describe the
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(a) Original frame (I) (b) Motion + Texture encryption ([15]) (c) Proposed Motion+texture+structure encryption
(d) Sobel filter on the original frame (I) (e) Sobel filter on the traditional scheme (f) Sobel filter on the proposed scheme
Fig. 8: Application of a Sobel filter on the first (I) frame of H.264/AVC encoded BQMall sequence encrypted with both SE
methods. One can note the high preservation of the structure in the center image.
(a) Luminance similarity scores (b) Edge similarity scores
Fig. 9: Frame per frame numerical analysis of the effect of motion, texture, and the proposed structure encryption on the first
40 frames of BQMall sequence (HEVC, 832x480, QP22, GOP16).
(a) Luminance similarity scores (b) Edge similarity scores
Fig. 10: Frame per frame numerical analysis of the proposed encryption (motion + texture + structure) compared to the state
of the art approach [15] (motion + texture) on the first 40 frames of BQMall sequence (HEVC, 832x480, QP22, GOP16).
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H.264/AVC
Sequence (Class) Original State of the art [15] Proposed Extended Encryption Space
PSNR SSIM LSS ESS PSNR SSIM LSS ESS PSNR SSIM LSS ESS
BasketballDrive (B1) 44.2 0.943 1.0 0.907 12.3 0.32 -2.4 0.37 10.2 0.27 -1.45 0.33
Kimono (B2) 43.1 0.945 1.0 0.947 9.17 0.33 -2.5 0.45 6.2 0.29 -3.78 0.42
BQMall (C) 40.0 0.934 1.0 0.924 10.9 0.25 -1.6 0.60 10.1 0.24 -1.9 0.49
BasketballPass (D) 41.9 0.932 1.0 0.922 13.8 0.24 -1.2 0.43 13.9 0.24 -1.1 0.37
Vidyo1 (E) 43.6 0.979 1.0 0.960 10.9 0.46 -1.91 0.46 10.3 0.46 -1.93 0.40
HEVC
Sequence (Class) Original State of the art [15] Proposed Extended Encryption Space
PSNR SSIM LSS ESS PSNR SSIM LSS ESS PSNR SSIM LSS ESS
BasketballDrive (B1) 41.75 0.952 1.0 0.911 11.4 0.40 -1.83 0.38 10.4 0.43 -2.10 0.36
Kimono (B2) 43.1 0.958 1.0 0.952 10.1 0.32 -2.11 0.48 6.6 0.27 -2.05 0.42
BQMall (C) 41.7 0.943 1.0 0.962 10.1 0.28 -1.70 0.62 10.2 0.24 -1.79 0.51
BasketballPass (D) 44.6 0.936 1.0 0.910 12.5 0.35 -1.22 0.44 12.6 0.34 -1.23 0.37
Vidyo1 (E) 44.9 0.992 1.0 0.982 11.6 0.45 -1.67 0.49 11.0 0.45 -1.77 0.38
TABLE III: Overall results of the proposed scheme for both H.264/AVC and HEVC compressed streams (200 frames).
I P/B Sequence Min./Max.
Bitrate increase +0.30% +0.03% +0.08% +0.0% / +1.4%
ES extension +36% +4.2% +12% +0.0% / +123%
PSNR (dB) -25.0 -24.32 -24.35 -30.1 / -14.1
SSIM -0.32 -0.298 -0.299 -0.42 / -0.25
TABLE IV: Other numerical consequences of the proposed
Intra prediction mode encryption on H.264/AVC CABAC
mix sequence stream (QP30, CIF, 2700 frames).
losses in quality (PSNR) and in structural coherence (SSIM)
inside the frames. Nevertheless, PSNR/SSIM correlation to the
human perceived intelligibility is limited [40] and they do not
perform well in comparing two heavily deteriorated versions
of the same source video. Indeed, such an analysis is somehow
far from the traditional field of use of these metrics [41], and
to compare PSNR scores below 15dB can hardly suffice for a
robust and reliable evaluation of our results.
Therefore, our evaluation will also rely on two other metrics
proposed in [42], the Luminance Similarity Score (LSS)
and the Edge Similarity Score (ESS), which are particularly
adapted to partially encrypted content. LSS is a block-based
luminance similarity measure based on the comparison of the
average luminance values of 16x16 (or 8x8) non-overlapping
blocks. The resulting score can be negative, and caps to 1 (in
the case of two identical or almost identical images). On the
other hand, ESS aims at measuring the degree of resemblance
of edge and contour information. Its computation exploits
the same block-partition as LSS, then implements a Sobel
operator to extract a dominant edge direction per block. These
edge directions are then compared to produce the ESS score
that ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the highest level
of similarity. Alongside with a precise description of these
measures, [42] also provides thresholds LSSth and ESSth
corresponding to heavily distorted contents are set to 0 and
0.5 respectively.
In Figure 9, we use these latter metrics to study the scram-
bling effect of the three different ES over the first 40 frames
of BQMall sequence. As we already pointed out, motion
I P/B Sequence Min. / Max.
Bitrate increase +0.89% +0.21% +0.40% +0.0% / +2.0%
ES extension +57.0% +11.4% +24.1% +0.0% / +149%
PSNR (dB) -27.9 -26.13 -26.25 -31.4 / -13.3
SSIM -0.42 -0.38 -0.39 -0.49 / -0.33
TABLE V: Other numerical consequences of the proposed
Intra prediction mode encryption on HEVC mix sequence
stream (QP28, CIF, 2700 frames).
encryption has no impact on I frames. Its impact on P frames
increases due to the hierarchical configuration of the encoding,
but remains quite limited (above the thresholds of 0 and 0.5 set
in [42] to LSS and ESS respectively). In comparison, texture
and structure encryption provide better results from both LSS
and ESS metrics. If texture encryption slightly outperforms
the proposed structure encryption considering the luminance
based metric, the opposite effect is observed with the structural
metric ESS. Plus, it is to highlight in this Figure that the
impact of the proposed Intra prediction mode encryption is
not limited to Intra frames. Indeed, the effect propagates
naturally throughout the entire GOP due to the predictive
coding strategy used in video encoders. In Figure 10, the frame
per frame analysis is complemented by a comparison between
the state of the art approach [15] and the extended scheme
proposed in this paper. If both methods efficiently conceal the
luminance information (results far under the 0 threshold in
Figure 10a), our approach improves the structural deterioration
measured by the ESS (fig. 10b).
We gather in Table III a comparative evaluation of the SE
scrambling efficiency based on sequences used during HEVC
standardization [36]. Numerical results tend to confirm that,
on substantially all tested videos, the proposed encryption
scheme offers a higher deterioration than the traditional by-
pass only encryption scheme. The increased structural impact
is confirmed by both SSIM and ESS measures. More generally,
since the four metrics - and particularly the LSS and the ESS -
intend to measure the amount of information leakage through
an attacked image, the proposed numerical analysis efficiently
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supports the visual analysis performed in the previous section.
Our method, by associating the three different domains of
encryption, brings a notable improvement to the state-of-the-
art approach relying on motion and texture encryption only.
2) Other consequences of encrypting Intra prediction
modes: Apart from the visual impact on the video content,
our approach exhibits some other noticeable characteristics.
First, since the encryption of CABAC regular-mode is per-
formed in addition to the traditional by-pass only encryption,
the ES is widened and the amount of bins encrypted per
frame is increased. Second, the more regular-mode treated
syntax elements are encrypted, the more their relative statistics
are modified. As a direct result, there is a high risk that
the probability model used during the table-based binary
arithmetic coding does not describe efficiently the disturbed
statistics. In practice, this side effect reduces the CABAC
compression efficiency, causing the encrypted bitstream to be
slightly bigger in size than its original version.
To measure both of these effects, a 2700 frames video
stream is encoded from a concatenation of 9 CIF reference
sequences (akiyo, mobile, bus, container, foreman, etc.). Doing
so, we ensure that a wide variety of scene types are gathered
(textures, object motion, camera motion, etc.). The results are
presented in Table IV and Table V. A significant difference
is observed between I and P/B frames. Indeed, the proposed
Intra prediction encryption affects mostly I frames, from
both the ES extension (+36% and +54% bins attacked) and
the bitrate increase perspectives. In the case of P/B frames,
motion encryption is included into the ES and the presence
of Intra blocks diminishes, which explains the reduction of
the relative impact of structure encryption. Average bitrate
increase (+0.08% and +0.4%) shows that the induced overhead
remains negligible, and perfectly viable in most use cases (e.g.
a transport protocol should not need to repacketize stream
chunks due to excessive sizes). More specifically, the max-
imum observed is +2% which ensures that no drastic bitrate
modification is caused by the proposed extended scheme.
Tables IV and V also gather the delta PSNR and SSIM
results obtained using the proposed Intra prediction encryption
alone. Since we suggest in this paper to include this specific
syntax element into the traditional ES, we have to ensure
that their encryption is worth the subsequent bitrate increase.
In [15], the impact of each cipherable HEVC codeword
is analyzed independently, which allows to conduct a fair
comparison. The major effect of Intra prediction encryption
on the video content rendering is illustrated by delta PSNR
of -24.35 and -26.25dB and delta SSIM of -0.299dB to -
0.39dB. These results have to be put into perspective with the
analysis conducted in [15] : the other impacting codewords
like residual signs or delta QP cap respectively to -22dB and
-25dB of delta PSNR. Moreover, the bitrate increase caused
by their method of non-bitwise modifications (allowing larger
variations of the cipherable codewords) is more important that
the one our approach exhibits. From our study and the previous
work [15], it thus appears that Luma prediction mode for Intra
blocks/units is the most impacting codeword in the extended
ES, and causes only very little bitrate increase.
We now discuss the effect of QP variations on the scram-
QP Vidyo1 Original SoA [15] Proposed
PSNR (dB) 44.3 10.2 9.82
8 SSIM 0.98 0.52 0.49
Encryption Space - 47500 62500 (+30%)
PSNR (dB) 43.7 10.6 9.90
16 SSIM 0.97 0.57 0.52
Encryption Space - 13950 20700 (+48%)
PSNR (dB) 42.5 11.1 11.0
24 SSIM 0.96 0.57 0.53
Encryption Space - 3875 6250 (+61%)
PSNR (dB) 39.8 12.9 11.2
32 SSIM 0.95 0.61 0.55
Encryption Space - 1125 2435 (+116%)
PSNR (dB) 36.0 14.2 11.9
40 SSIM 0.92 0.70 0.62
Encryption Space - 357 1057 (+196%)
QP Kimono Original SoA [15] Proposed
PSNR (dB) 51.45 8.7 8.28
8 SSIM 0.99 0.50 0.47
Encryption Space - 1060000 1181000 (+11%)
PSNR (dB) 44.4 11.0 10.8
16 SSIM 0.96 0.50 0.49
Encryption Space - 171800 198240 (+15%)
PSNR (dB) 41.76 9.62 9.23
24 SSIM 0.93 0.49 0.48
Encryption Space - 42690 44700 (+4%)
PSNR (dB) 37.7 14.0 11.9
32 SSIM 0.90 0.56 0.53
Encryption Space - 10550 11400 (+8%)
PSNR (dB) 33.47 10.8 9.82
40 SSIM 0.86 0.57 0.53
Encryption Space - 2280 2800 (+22%)
TABLE VI: Effect of QP variation on the SE efficiency
on two different sequences. Top: Vidyo1 (HEVC, 1280x720,
200 frames); Bot: Kimono (HEVC, 1920x1080, 200 frames).
The state of the art approach of [15] is denoted as SoA.
The encryption space is measured as the average number of
encrypted bins per frame.
bling performance of the SE approach, illustrated by Table
VI. When the QP increases, the compressed stream bitrate
diminishes in parallel. Consequently, the ES shrinks and one
could have concerns that there is not enough cipherable
codewords for robust SE. We measured this effect on two very
different sequences : Vidyo1 has only very limited movement
and relies heavily on Intra prediction, whereas Kimono scene
exhibits more motion information (camera tracking, moving
textures). As expected for both streams, the ES diminishes
when QP increases, causing the SE scrambling effect to
globally weaken. More importantly, the relative impact of each
encrypted bin increases when the ES is really small, which
augments the variability of SE visual impact. Extending the
ES as proposed in this paper allows to get better scrambling
results over the whole tested QP range and, as a additional
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advantage, reduces the results uncertainty for the highest QPs.
Finally, the impact of SE is evaluated in terms of com-
plexity. Since the encryption process is embedded inside the
encoder/decoder, the processing time related to the compu-
tation of AES CTR block cipher is added to the standard
video processing. Considering our implementation of SE as
a symmetric transcoder, we cannot provide explicit results
on the relative complexity of SE compared to the encoding
step. However, we can refer to [25] and [30] where required
processing powers are evaluated for H.264/AVC and HEVC
sequences respectively. The orders of magnitude are consistent
between both standard: the encoding step requires less than
0.5% additional processing time, whereas SE impacts the
decoding with an additional 2% to 3% time. This distinction
arises from the major complexity difference between encoding
and decoding processes in H.264/AVC and HEVC standards.
To correlate these results with our symmetric transcoder
implementation, we re-use the 2700 frame CIF sequence
presented previously and perform its transcoding with HEVC.
When the standard ES is used (i.e. Intra prediction modes are
untouched), the transcoding time increases by 1.94% (from
15.21 to 15.50 seconds). This is coherent with results of [25]
and [30] since the complexity of the transcoder is slightly
higher than the one of a decoder, due to the necessary CABAC
re-encoding. When Intra prediction modes are included into
the ES, an additional 1.28% of processing time is needed (from
15.50 to 15.71 seconds). Such a result remains a negligible
increase in processing power, and can be managed well even
by hand-held devices.
D. Cabac regular mode statistical attack
From a security perspective, SE exhibits very different
characteristics than standard encryption algorithms. Indeed,
a stream that has been fully or partly (e.g.,with headers
preserved) protected by raw encryption is not format compliant
anymore. Since the structure of compressed streams is highly
specific, attacks can try to exploit format priors (presence
of start codes, symbols validity, etc.) to help the brute force
search. In contrast, SE is more a scrambling technique based
on valid stream modifications, which prevents the attacker
from having any prior information on the protected stream.
The only possible angle of attack is a computer vision assisted
unscrambling approach which aim at recovering maximum
intelligibility. Moreover, the lack of prior information prevents
any attack from converging surely to the original stream.
In such a context, our extended approach that increases the
scrambling performance - hardening computer vision recovery
- and the number of protected bins - widening the search
domain - brings an improvement to the overall robustness of
the SE protection.
Unscrambling methods can be based on known-plaintext -
or replacement - attacks as presented in [30]. It consists in
setting to a predefined value all cipherable bins in order to limit
the scrambling effect of SE. Such an approach could possibly
be efficient to attack the proposed Luma Intra prediction
mode encryption. Indeed, codewords encoded with CABAC
regular mode rely on probability models, providing statistical
(a) Intra prediction encryption visual result (PSNR encrypted: 15.43dB).
(b) MPS-based recovery (PSNR attacked: 15.28dB).
Fig. 11: Effect of structure encryption (scrambling of Intra
prediction modes) on one frame of Mix sequence (2700
frames, CIF, PSNR original: 41.3dB) and visual result of the
MPS-based replacement attack.
information that can be exploited by an attacker to recover
the modified bins. Namely, a Most Probable Symbol (MPS)
which depends on the current context is available for each bin
encoded in regular mode. In this section, we thus evaluate the
performance of an unscrambling replacement approach relying
on the MPS to recover the encrypted Luma prediction modes.
In H.264/AVC, a 3-bins codeword - designated as
rem intra pred mode - allows to infer which prediction mode
amongst the nine available is used by the current block. This
codeword is fully encoded with CABAC regular mode, which
allows to envision a statistical attack. In HEVC, the encoding
of Intra prediction modes has been modified and the arithmetic
coding now relies on CABAC by-pass mode to encode the
corresponding bins. Their encryption do impact - through the
residual encoding - the CABAC regular-mode, but this cannot
be exploited to conduct an unscrambling MPS-based approach.
The attack performed in this section is thus only applicable
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Protected stream
Nb. Intra blocks 690 192
Nb. separately coded * 324 581 (47%)
Nb. cipherable modes 291 065 (42%)
Nb. cipherable bins (3/mode) 873 195
Attacked stream
Nb. protected bins 873 195
Nb. bins correctly derived from MPS 418 959 (47.98%)
Nb. protected modes 291 065
Nb modes recovered 29 980 (10.3%)
TABLE VII: Intra prediction mode statistics in the protected
Mix sequence stream, and results of the MPS-based replace-
ment attack. *: An Intra block is separately coded if it uses
the 3-bin rem intra pred mode to infer the prediction mode.
to H.264/AVC encoded streams. Note that we suppose that
the attacker exactly knows which blocks are considered as
cipherable and which bins are encrypted.
The MPS-based attack on Intra prediction modes is con-
ducted on the 2700 frames Mix sequence presented in the
previous section, protected using the proposed structure en-
cryption. Thus, to show the robustness of our method, we
propose in this paragraph to only encrypt one codeword:
the rem intra pred mode specifying the intra mode when it
is not derived from the neighborhood. The visual result of
encrypting only this codeword is depicted in Figure 11 and
the corresponding statistics are presented in the first part of
Table VII.
The attack simply consists in replacing every bin by its
corresponding MPS, which is accessible in the CABAC engine
during decoding. The visual result of this replacement attack
is illustrated in Figure 11b and the corresponding statistics are
summarized in Table VII. The MPS-based recovery correctly
deciphers 47.98% of the encrypted bins, and solely 10.3% of
the protected prediction modes are recovered. This does not
allow to efficiently unscramble the video content (fig. 11b),
and the attacked stream even has a lowered PSNR (-0.15dB).
Thus, using the MPS as a prior for replacement attacks does
not seem reliable enough, and cannot be easily exploited by
attackers to efficiently unscramble the protected contents.
More generally, such an analysis questions the interest of
using a context modeling stage in the encoding of the Intra
prediction modes. Indeed, in terms of compression efficiency,
CABAC regular mode outperforms the by-pass mode only if a
majority of the encoded bins are equal to their corresponding
MPS. Encoding a codeword which is badly predicted by a con-
text model results in a decreased compression efficiency and an
increased computational cost. We evaluated the pertinence of
the MPS representation of the rem intra pred mode codeword
on almost 1 million bins of the original Mix sequence stream:
only 52.4% are equal to their respective MPS, which tend to
confirm that the model representation is hardly efficient for
encoding the Intra prediction modes.
We showed in this security analysis that H.264/AVC MPS-
based replacement attacks do not allow to efficiently unscram-
ble protected streams because of the unpredictable probability
distribution of the rem intra pred mode codeword, which is
further randomized by the encryption process. Eventually, such
a result can be put in perspective with two other claims: first,
the simplification of this step in HEVC (related codewords
now encoded in by-pass mode) is justified by the inability
to effectively predict the corresponding bins with a context
model. Second, the fact that Intra prediction encryption only
causes very little bitrate increase is confirmed: since the prob-
ability model used cannot really exploit the symbol statistics
to improve the compression efficiency, the modification of
these statistics do not drastically disrupt the compression
capabilities.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes a novel method for SE of H.264/AVC
(CABAC) and HEVC compressed streams. Our approach
tackles the main security challenge of SE: the limitation of
the information leakage through protected video streams.
The encryption of Luma prediction modes for Intra
blocks/units is proposed in addition to the traditional ES in
order to significantly improve the structural deterioration of
video contents. Especially on I frames, it brings a solid com-
plement to previous SE schemes relying on residual encryption
(mainly affecting the texture of objects) and motion vector
encryption (disrupting the movement of objects). The pro-
posed scheme shows both numerical and visual improvements
of the scrambling performance regarding state-of-the-art SE
schemes. Based on the encryption of regular-mode treated
syntax element, the approach exhibits a loss in compression
efficiency that has been estimated empirically up to 2% on I
frames, which remains, in a lot of application cases, a totally
tolerable variation.
In this paper, we complemented the state of the art analysis
proposed in [15] of the impact of each cipherable syntax
element in HEVC standard with the proposed Intra prediction
encryption. The study confirms the premise that targeting
this specific element is particularly efficient from the SE
perspective: the PSNR and SSIM variations we obtain tend
to demonstrate that it is the most impacting codeword in the
proposed ES. Considering their role in the video reconstruc-
tion, such a result is not really surprising: their encryption
heavily impacts Intra frames but also Intra blocks/units in Inter
frames, and the generated error naturally drifts both spatially
and temporally within the video stream.
We did not provide in this paper an exhaustive analysis
of CABAC regular mode cipherable syntax elements. Some
of them are easily identifiable (for example, the process
proposed in this paper could almost identically apply to the
Intra prediction modes for Chroma components), but a large
majority of these cipherable elements would require a very
specific monitoring which we did not address in our study. An
analysis of the maximum ES for both H.264/AVC and HEVC,
based on the proposed regular mode encryption, is thus one
major track for future research. Nevertheless, such a study
would have to pay a particular attention to a critical trade-
off we highlighted in our study; the underlying correlation
between the improvement of the scrambling performance and
its consequences on the compression efficiency.
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